This book examines whether human beings should reflect on, and hence come to know and understand, their own commitments—these being beliefs, desires, and intentions that are held and defended on the basis of judgments about the true and the good. It begins by distinguishing committed attitudes from brute attitudes and addressing metaphysical concerns, paving the way for an in-depth inquiry into why reflection on the former might matter. The author critiques prevailing theories that tie reflective commitment to phenomena such as rationality, inferential cognition, or intentional action, exposing their limitations. Thereafter, the book argues that reflective commitment matters for safeguarding oneself against manipulation, enabling interpersonal reasoning, and maintaining coherent agency. This work is indispensable for graduate students and researchers in analytic epistemology and the philosophy of mind with an interest in self-knowledge and related issues, as well as interdisciplinary scholars in psychology and the philosophy of language, particularly those studying self-deception, inference, and attitude ascriptions.
