This book challenges the widespread assumption that a necessary preliminary to qualitative research is the formulation of ontological and epistemological beliefs. It argues that the metaphysical claims which supposedly underpin different approaches to social research do not make sense. Literally. Sentences such as -There is a single objective reality- and -There are multiple constructed realities- fail to make information-providing statements. They do not refer or describe. Despite appearances, they say nothing about reality (or realities) at a fundamental level, so they cannot be used to justify, ground, or align with, methodological decisions. The -necessary preliminary- turns out not to be necessary at all; and we can dispense with, not just -paradigms-, but metaphysical underpinnings in general, whether structured as paradigms or not.
Drawing on Wittgenstein-s later philosophy, Carnap-s metametaphysics, and contemporary linguistics, the book suggests that the metap
