Throughout the history of Heideggerian thought - a thought which surely shapes our understanding of -Being- in the 20th and 21st century (as well as the history of western metaphysics in general) - there seems to be no place for what Plato, Hegel and Marx before him called -dialectics-. For Heidegger, the dialectical method was -a philosophical embarrassment-. Equally, for one of our more contemporary philosophers, Graham Harman, there is no appearance of the word -dialectic- in his complete oeuvre. In this relatively short book, Johns and Bensusan, in the style of Derrida, looks over the absence or spectre of the signifier -dialectic- in both Heidegger and Harman-s work, arguing that such a negation of the term turns out to be more of an intentional repression than any passive neglection. Rather, the editors insist that such a repression finds its way into their writing as an alternative interpretation of their core concepts. Bringing together for the first time Hegelian though
